

TAB 11

COURT FILE NO.: 04-CL-5306

DATE: 20060120

**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
(Commercial List)**

RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO STELCO INC. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A"

APPLICATION UNDER THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

BEFORE: FARLEY J.

COUNSEL: Michael Barrack, James D. Gage and Geoff R. Hall, for the Applicants
Robert Thornton and Kyla Mahar, for the Monitor
Peter Jervis, George Glezos and Karen Kiang, for the Equity Holders
John Varley, for the Salaried Employees
David Jacobs, for USW Locals 8782 and 5328
Aubrey Kauffman, for Tricap Management Ltd.
Kevin Zych and Rick Orzy, for the 8% and 10.4% Stelco Bondholders
Lawrence Thacker, for the Directors of Stelco
Sharon White, for USW Local 1005
Ken Rosenberg, for USW International
Kevin McElcheran, for GE
Gale Rubenstein and Fred Myers, for the Superintendent of Financial Services
Derrick Tay, for Mittal
David R. Byers and Sean Dunphy, for CIT Business Credit as DIP and ABL Lender
V. Gauthier, for BABC Global Finance
L. Edwards, for EDS Canada Inc.
Peter Jacobsen, for Globe & Mail
Paul Macdonald and Andy Kent, for Sunrise and Appalloosa
Murray Gold and Andrew Hatnay, for the Salaried Retirees
Flaviano Stanc, Self-Represented

HEARD: January 17-18, 2006, with further information January 20, 2006

ENDORSEMENT

**(Motion by the Applicants for a Sanction Order
and Cross-Motion of Certain Equity Holders)**

- [1] The Applicants (collectively "Stelco") moved for:
- (a) a declaration that Stelco has complied with the provisions of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") and the orders of this court made in this CCAA proceeding;
 - (b) a declaration that the Stelco plan of arrangement pursuant to the CCAA and the reorganization of Stelco Inc. ("S") under the *Canada Business Corporations Act* ("CBCA") (collectively the "Plan") as voted on by the affected creditors of Stelco is fair and reasonable;
 - (c) an order sanctioning and approving the Plan; and
 - (d) an order extending the Stay Period and Stay Date in the Initial Order until March 31, 2006.

[2] This relief was unopposed by any of the stakeholders except for various existing shareholders of S (who may also be employees or retirees of Stelco). In particular there was organized objection to the Plan, especially as in essence the Plan would eliminate the existing shareholders, by a group of shareholders (AGF Management Ltd., Stephen Stow, Pollitt & Co., Levi Giesbrecht, Joe Falco and Phil Dawson) who have styled themselves as "The Equity Holders" ("EH"). On December 23, 2005 the EH brought in essence a cross motion seeking the following relief:

- (a) An order extending the powers of the Monitor, Ernst & Young, in order to conduct a sale of the entire Stelco enterprise as a going concern through a sale of the common shares or assets of Stelco on such terms and conditions as are considered fair;
- (b) An order authorizing and directing the Monitor to implement and to take all steps necessary to complete and fulfill all requirements, terms, conditions and steps of such a sale;
- (c) An order authorizing and directing the Monitor to conduct the sale process in accordance with a plan for the sale process approved by the court;
- (d) An order directing the Monitor to retain such fully independent financial advisors and other advisors as necessary to conduct this sale process;

- (e) An order confirming that the powers granted herein to the Monitor supersede any provision of any prior Order of this Court made in the within proceedings to the extent that such provision of any prior order is inconsistent with or contradictory to this order, or would otherwise limit or hinder the power and authority granted to the Monitor;
- (f) An order directing Stelco and its directors, officers, counsel, agents, professional advisors and employees, and its Chief Restructuring Officer, to cooperate fully with the Monitor with regard to this sale process, and to provide the Monitor with such assistance as may be requested by the Monitor or its independent advisors;
- (g) In the alternative, an order suspending the sanctioning of the Proposed Plan of Arrangement, approved by the creditors on December 9, 2005, for a period of two months from the date of such order, so that the Monitor may conduct the independent sale process that may result in a more profitable outcome for all stakeholders, including the Equity Holders;
- (h) In the further alternative, an order lifting the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* stay of proceedings in respect of Stelco without approving the Plan of Arrangement, as approved by the creditors on December 9, 2005, pursuant to such terms as are just and are directed by court; and
- (i) Such further and other relief as counsel may advise and this Honourable Court may permit.

[3] In its factum, the EH requested that the court adjourn approval of the Plan for 60 days and direct the Monitor to conduct an independent sale process for the shares of S. In the attendances on January 17 and 18, 2006, the EH then asked that approval of the Plan be adjourned for 30 days in order to see if there were expressions of interest for the shares of S forthcoming in the interim.

[4] I indicated that I would defer my consideration of the adjournment request until after I had had submissions on the motions before me as set out above. I also indicated that while there did not appear to be any concern by anyone including the EH as to the first two elements concerning CCAA plan sanctioning as discussed in *Re Algoma Steel Inc.* (2001), 30 C.B.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. S.C.J.) at p. 3:

In a sanction hearing under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") the general principles to be applied in the exercise of the court's discretion are:

- (a) There must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements and adherence to the previous orders of the court;

- (b) All materials filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done or purported to be done which is not authorized by the CCAA; and
- (c) The Plan must be fair and reasonable.

See *Northland Properties Ltd., Re* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (B.C. S.C.), affirmed *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada* (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C. C.A.) at p. 201; *Campeau Corp., Re* (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 104 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 109; *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.* (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 506; *Sammi Allas Inc., Re* (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at pp. 172-3; *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269 (Alta. Q.B.), leave to appeal dismissed, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 314 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]).

it would not be sufficient to only deal in this hearing with the third test of whether the Plan was fair and reasonable (including the aspect of “fair, reasonable and equitable” as discussed in *Sammi*). Rather the court also had to be concerned as to whether the Plan was implementable. In other words, it would be futile and useless for the court to approve a plan which stood no reasonable prospect of being implemented. That concern of the court had been raised by my having been alerted by the Monitor in its 46th Report at paragraphs 8-9:

- 8. The Monitor has had discussions with the proposed ABL lenders, Tricap, the Province and Stelco regarding the status of the ABL Loan and the Bridge Loan. The Monitor has been advised that the parties are continuing to work at resolving issues that are outstanding as at the date of this Forty-Sixth Report. However, all of the parties remain optimistic that acceptable solutions to the outstanding issues will be found and implemented.
- 9. In the Monitor’s view, the principal issues to be resolved include:
 - (a) the corporate structure of Stelco, which could involve the transfer of assets of some of the operations or divisions of the Applicants to new affiliates; and
 - (b) satisfying the ABL lenders and Tricap as to the priority of the new financing.

These issues need to be resolved primarily among the proposed ABL lenders, Tricap and Stelco and will also involve the Province insofar as they affect pension and related liabilities.

[5] I was particularly disquieted by the lack of progress in dealing with these outstanding matters despite the passage of 39 days since the Plan was positively voted on December 9, 2005. I do appreciate that Christmas, Hanukkah and New Year's were celebrated in this interval and that there had been a certain "negotiation fatigue" leading up to the December 9th revisions to the Plan and that I have advocated that counsel, other professionals and litigation participants balance their lives and pay particular attention to family and health. However I find it unfortunate that there would appear to have been such a lengthy hiatus, especially when the workers at Stelco continued (as they have for the past two years while Stelco has been under CCAA protection) to produce steel in record amounts. I therefore demanded that evidence be produced forthwith to demonstrate to my satisfaction that progress was real and substantial so that I could be satisfied about implementability. As a side note I would observe that in the "normal" case, sanction orders are typically sought within two or three days of a positive creditor vote so that it is not unusual for documentation to be sorted out for a month before a plan is implemented with a closing.

[6] The EH filed material to support its submission that the Plan is not fair, reasonable and equitable because it is alleged that there is currently sufficient value in Stelco to fully satisfy the claims of affected and unaffected creditors and to provide at least some value to current shareholders. The EH prefers to have a search for some entity to take out the current shareholders for "value". Fabrice Taylor, a chartered financial analyst with Pollit & Co. swore an affidavit on the eve of this hearing which was sent electronically to the service list on January 16, 2006 at approximately 7:30 p.m. In that affidavit, he states:

2. The Dofasco bidding war has highlighted a crucial fact about steel asset valuations, notably that strategic buyers place a much higher value on them than public market investors. Attached as Exhibit "1" is an article entitled "Restructuring of steel industry revives investors' interest", published in the Financial Times on December 14, 2005.
3. I, along with Murray Pollitt and a number of Stelco shareholders, have spent the past three months attempting to attract strategic buyers and/or equity investors in Stelco. These strategic buyers and equity investors are mostly international. Some had already considered buying Stelco or had made bids for the company but had stopped following the story some months ago. Others were not very familiar with Stelco.
4. Three factors hindered our efforts. First, Stelco is under CCAA protection, a complicated situation involving multiple players and interests (unions, politics, pensions) that is difficult to understand, particularly for foreigners. Second, there has not been enough time for these strategic buyers or equity investors to deepen their understanding or to perform due diligence. Finally, the Dofasco bid process, while providing emphatic evidence that steel assets are increasingly valuable, hinders certain strategic buyers and financial

institutions interested in participating in Stelco because they are distracted and/or conflicted by the Dofasco sale. I have been advised by some of the participants in the Dofasco negotiations that they would be willing to carefully consider a Stelco transaction once the Dofasco sale has been resolved.

5. The Forty Fifth Report of the Monitor confirmed that Stelco had not received any offers in the last several months. The report does not answer the question of whether the company or its financial advisors have in fact attempted to attract any offers. I believe that Stelco would have received expressions of interest had the company made efforts to attract offers, or had the Dofasco sale been resolved earlier. I believe that the Monitor should be authorized, for a period of at least 60 days, to canvas interest in a sale of Stelco before the approval of the proposed plan of restructuring.

[7] No satisfactory explanation was forthcoming as to why this affidavit, if it needed to be filed at all, was not served and filed by December 23, 2005, in accordance with the timetable which the EH and the other stakeholders agreed to. Certainly there is nothing in the affidavit which is such late breaking news that this deadline could not have been met, let alone that it was served mere hours before the hearing commenced on January 17, 2006. Aside from the fact that the financing arrangements forming the basis of the Plan contained "no shop" covenants which would make it inappropriate and a breach to try to attract other offers, the foregoing excerpts from the Taylor affidavit clearly illustrate that despite apparently diligent efforts by the EH, no one has shown any real or realistic interest in Stelco. Reading between the lines and without undue speculation, it would appear that the efforts of the EH were merely politely rebuffed.

[8] Certainly Stelco is not Dofasco, nor is it truly a comparable (as opposed to a contraster). Stelco has been a wobbly company for a long time. Further as I indicated in my October 3, 2005 endorsement, in the preceding 20 months under the CCAA protection, Stelco has become "shopped worn". The unusual elevation of steel prices in the past two years has helped Stelco avoid the looming liquidity crisis which it anticipated in its CCAA filing on January 29, 2004. However even this financial transfusion has not allowed it to become a healthy company or truly given it a burgeoning war chest to weather bad times the way that other steel companies (including some in Canada) have so benefited. The redness of the visage of Stelco is not a true indication of health and well being; rather it seems that it is rouge to mask a deep pallor.

[9] I am satisfied on the evidence of Hap Stephen, the Chief Restructuring Officer of Stelco and of the Monitor that there has been compliance with all statutory requirements and adherence to previous orders of the court and further that nothing has been done or purported to be done that is not authorized by the CCAA.

[10] The next question to be dealt with is whether the Plan is fair, reasonable and equitable. I was advised that creditors of the affected creditor classes representing approximately 90% in value of each class voted on the Plan. The Monitor reported at para. 19 of its 44th Report as to the results of the vote held December 9th as follows:

Class of Affected Creditors	Percentage in favour by Number	Percentage in favour by Dollar Value
Stelco	78.4%	87.7%
Stelwire	89.01%	83.47%
Stelpipe	94.38%	86.71%
CHT Steel	100%	100%
Welland Pipe	100%	100%

[11] This favourable vote by the affected creditors is substantially in excess of the statutory two-thirds requirement. By itself that type of vote, particularly with such a large quorum present, would ordinarily be very convincing for a court not interfering with the informed decisions of business people. With that guideline, plus the aspect that a plan need not be perfect, together with the lack of any affected creditor opposition to the Plan being sanctioned and the fact that the Plan including its ingredients and nature and amount of compromise compensation to be given to affected creditors having been exhaustively negotiated in hard bargaining by the larger creditor groups who are recognized as generally being sophisticated and experienced in this area, and the consideration of the elements in the next paragraph, it would seem to me that the Plan is fair, reasonable and equitable vis-à-vis the affected creditors and I so find. See *Sammi*, at p. 173; *Re T. Eaton Co.* (1999), 15 C.B.R. (4th) 311 (Ont. S.C.J.) at p. 313; *Re Olympia & York Developments Ltd.* (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500 (Gen. Div) at p. 510.

[12] I also think it helpful to examine the situation pursuant to the analysis which Paperny J. did in *Re Canadian Airlines Corp.* (2000), 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1 (Alta. Q.B.), leave to appeal refused (2000), 20 C.B.R. (4th) 46 (Alta C.A. [In Chambers]). That proceeding also involved an application pursuant to the corporate legislation, the *Business Corporations Act (Alberta)*, concerning the shares and shareholders of Canadian Airlines. In that case, Paperny J. found the following factors to be relevant:

- (a) the composition of the vote: claims must have been properly classified, with no secret arrangements to give an advantage to a creditor or creditors; approval of the plan by the requisite majority of creditors is most important (in the case before me of Stelco: the challenge to classification was dismissed; there was no suggestion of secret arrangements; and, as discussed above, the quorum and size of the positive vote were very high);

- (b) anticipated receipts in liquidation or bankruptcy: it is helpful if the Monitor or other disinterested person has prepared a liquidation analysis (in Stelco, the Monitor determined that on liquidation, affected creditor recovery would likely range from 13 to 28 cents on the dollar; it should also be observed that Stelco has engaged in extensive testing of the market as to possible capital raising or sale with the aid of established firms and professionals of great experience and had come up dry.);
- (c) alternatives to the proposed plan: it is significant if other options have been explored and rejected as unworkable (in Stelco; see comment in (b));
- (d) oppression of the rights of certain creditors (in Stelco, this was not a live issue as nothing of this sort was alleged);
- (e) unfairness to shareholders (in Stelco, this will be dealt with later in my reasons; however allow me to observe that the interests of shareholders becomes engaged if they are not so far underwater that there is a reasonable prospect in the foreseeable future that the fortunes of a company would otherwise likely be turned around so that they would not continue to be submerged); and
- (f) the public interest: the retention of jobs for employees and the support of the plan by the company's unions is important (in Stelco, the Plan does not call for reductions in employment; there is provision for continuation of the capital expenditure program and its funding; an important enterprise for the municipal and provincial levels of government would be preserved with continuing benefits for those communities; an important customer and supplier would continue in the industry and maintain competition; the USW International Union and its locals (except for local 1005) supported the Plan and indeed were instrumental in bringing Tricap Management Limited to the table (local 1005's position was that it did not wish to engage in the CCAA process in any meaningful way as it was content to rely upon its existing collective agreement which now still has several months to go before expiring).

However that is not the end of that issue: what of the shareholders?

[13] Is the Plan fair, reasonable and equitable for the existing shareholders of S? They will be wiped out under the Plan and their shares eliminated. New equity will be created in which the existing shareholders will not participate. They have not been allowed to vote on the Plan.

[14] It is well established that a reorganization pursuant to s. 191 of the CBCA may be made in conjunction with a sanction order under the CCAA and that such a reorganization may result in the cancellation of existing shares of the reorganized corporation based on those shares/equity having no present value (in the sense of both value "now" and the likelihood of same having value in the reasonably foreseeable future, absent the reorganization including new debt and equity injections and permitted indulgences or other considerations and adjustments). See *Re Beatrice Foods Inc.* (1996), 43 C.B.R. (4th) 10 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 10-15; *Re Laidlaw Inc.* (2003), 39 C.B.R. (4th) 230 (Ont. S.J.C.); *Algoma* at para. 7; *Cable Satisfaction International Inc. v. Richter & Associés Inc.* (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 205 (Que. S.C.) at p. 217. The Dickenson Report, which articulated the basis for the reform of corporate law that resulted in the enactment of the CBCA, described the object of s. 191 as being:

to enable the court to effect any necessary amendment to the articles of the corporation in order to achieve the objective of the reorganization without having to comply with all the formalities of the Draft Act, particularly shareholder approval of the proposed amendment (emphasis added): R.W.V. Dickenson, J.L. Howard, L. Getz, *Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada*, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971) at p. 124.

[15] The fairness, reasonableness and equitable aspects of a plan must be assessed in the context of the hierarchy of interests recognized by insolvency legislation and jurisprudence. See *Canadian Airlines* at pp. 36-7 where Paperny J. stated:

Where a company is insolvent, only the creditors maintain a meaningful stake in its assets. Through the mechanism of liquidation or insolvency legislation, the interests of shareholders are pushed to the bottom rung of the priority ladder. The expectations of creditors and shareholders must be viewed and measured against an altered financial and legal landscape. Shareholders cannot reasonably expect to maintain a financial interest in an insolvent company where creditors' claims are not being paid in full. It is through the lens of insolvency that the court must consider whether the acts of the company are in fact oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarded. CCAA proceedings have recognized that shareholders may not have "a true interest to be protected" because there is no reasonable prospect of economic value to be realized by the shareholders given the existing financial misfortunes of the company: *Royal Oak Mines Ltd.*, *supra*, para. 4., *Re Cadillac Fairview Inc.* (March 7, 1995), Doc. B28/95 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), and *T. Eaton Company*, *supra*.

To avail itself of the protection of the CCAA, a company must be insolvent. The CCAA considers the hierarchy of interests and assesses fairness and reasonableness in that context. The court's mandate not to sanction a plan in the absence of fairness necessitates the determination as to whether the complaints of dissenting creditors and shareholders are legitimate, bearing in mind the company's financial state. The articulated

purpose of the Act and the jurisprudence interpreting it, "widens the lens" to balance a broader range of interests that includes creditors and shareholders and beyond to the company, the employees and the public, and tests the fairness of the plan with reference to its impact on all of the constituents.

It is through the lens of insolvency legislation that the rights and interests of both shareholders and creditors must be considered. The reduction or elimination of rights of both groups is a function of the insolvency and not of oppressive conduct in the operation of the CCAA. The antithesis of oppression is fairness, the guiding test for judicial sanction. If a plan unfairly disregards or is unfairly prejudicial it will not be approved. However, the court retains the power to compromise or prejudice rights to effect a broader purpose, the restructuring of an insolvent company, provided that the plan does so in a fair manner."

[16] The question then is does the equity presently existing in S have true value at the present time independent of the Plan and what the Plan brings to the table? If it does then the interests of the EH and the other existing shareholders must be considered appropriately in the Plan. This is fairly put in K.P. McElcheran, *Commercial Insolvency in Canada* (Toronto, Lexis Nexis Canada Inc.: 2005) at p. 290 as:

If, at the time of the sanction hearing, the business and assets of the debtor have a value greater than the claims of the creditors, a plan of arrangement would not be fair and reasonable if it did not offer fair consideration to the shareholders.

[17] However if the shareholders truly have no economic interest to protect (keeping in mind that insolvency and the depth of that insolvency may vary according to which particular test of insolvency is applied in respect of a CCAA proceeding: as to which, see *Re Stelco Inc.*, [2004] O.J. No. 1257 (S.C.J. [Commercial List]), leave to appeal dismissed [2004] O.J. No. 1903 (C.A.), leave to appeal dismissed (S.C.C.) No. 30447). In *Cable Satisfaction*, Chaput J. at p. 218 observed that when shareholders have no economic interest to protect, then they have no claim to a right under the proposed arrangement and the "[m]ore so when, as in the present case, the shareholders are not contributing to any of the funding required by the Plan." I do note in the case of the Stelco Plan and the events leading up to it, including the capital raising and sale processes, that despite talk of an equity financing by certain shareholders, including the EH, no concrete offer ever surfaced.

[18] If the existing equity has no true value at present, then what is to be gained by putting off to tomorrow (the ever present and continuous problem in these proceedings of *manāna* - which never comes) what should be done today. The EH speculate, with no concrete basis for foundation as demonstrably illustrated by the eve of hearing Taylor affidavit discussed above, that something good may happen. I am of the view that that approach was accurately described in court by one counsel as a desperation Hail Mary pass and the willingness of someone, without any of his own chips, in the poker game willing to bet the farm of someone else who does have an economic interest in Stelco.

[19] I also think it fair to observe that in the determination of whether someone has an economic value, that analysis should be conducted on a reasonable and probable basis. In a somewhat different but applicable context, I observed in *New Quebec Raglan Mines Ltd. v. Blok-Andersen*, [1993] O.J. No. 727 at p. 3:

The "highest price" is not the price which could be derived on the basis of the most optimistic and risky assumptions without any regard as to their likelihood of being realized. It also seems to me that prudence would involve a consideration that there be certain fall back positions. Even in betting on horses, the most savvy and luckiest punter will not continue to stake all his winnings of the previous race on the next (and so on). If he does, he will go home wearing the barrel before the last race is run.

Alternatively there is a saying: "If wishes were horses, then beggars would ride."

[20] Unless I were to now dismiss the motion for sanctioning and approving the Plan because I found that it was not implementable and/or that it was not fair, reasonable and equitable to the existing shareholders (based upon the proviso that I did determine that the existing shareholders did have a valid present material equity of value), then I see no reason not to dismiss the motion of the EH concerning its request for an adjournment and its request for a further sale (or other related disposition) process. Allow me to observe that no matter how well intentioned the motion of the EH in that regard, I find that that request to be lacking in any valid substance. Rather, the evidence presented was in essence a chimera. I think it fair to observe that, with all the capital raising and sales processes to date which Stelco has undertaken in conjunction with its experienced and well placed professional advisers together with its Chief Restructuring Officer and the Monitor, the bushes have been exhaustively and well beaten as to any real possible interest. Despite three months of what one must presume to be diligent efforts, the EH have come up with nothing concrete. I do not find that the three factors mentioned by Taylor in his late-blooming affidavit of January 16th to be remotely close to convincing. The first two, if taken at face value, would lead one to the conclusion that no one has the time, interest or ability to take an interest in Stelco in any meaningful timeframe. The third presumes that the losing bidder for Dofasco, be it Arcelor or ThyssenKrupp, will almost automatically want Stelco - and at a price and upon terms which would result in present equity being attributed value. I must say in fairness that this is wishful thinking as neither of these warring bidders pursued any interest in Stelco during the previous processes. It is neither clear nor obvious why mere municipal proximity of Dofasco to Stelco's Hilton Works in Hamilton would now ignite any interest in Stelco.

[21] I also think it fair to observe that not proceeding with the sanction hearing now and indeed starting a brand new search for someone who will think Stelco so worthwhile that it will offer such a large amount (with or without onerous conditions) is akin to someone coming into court when a receiver is seeking court approval on a sale - and that someone being allowed to know the price and conditions - and then being able to make an offer for a price somewhat higher. (I reiterate that here we do not even have an offer or a price.) I do not see that such a procedure would be consistent with the principles laid out in *Royal Bank*

v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.). Given that the affected creditors have rather resoundingly voted in favour of the Plan, all in accordance with the provisions of the CCAA and the Court orders affecting the sanction, I would be of the view that if the existing equity has no value, then the EH's request in this respect would, if granted, be of significant detriment to the integrity of the insolvency system and regime. I would find that inappropriate to attempt to justify proceeding along that line.

[22] Allow me to return to the pivotal point concerning the question of whether the Plan is fair, reasonable and equitable, *vis-à-vis* the existing equity. The EH retained Navigant Consulting which relied upon the views of Metal Bulletin Research ("MBR") which, *inter alia*, predicted a selling spot price of hot roll steel at \$525 U.S. per ton. Navigant's conclusion in its December 8, 2005 report was that the value of residual shareholder equity was between \$1.1 to \$1.3 billion or a per share value of between \$10.76 and \$12.71. However, when Stelco pointed out certain deficiencies in this analysis, Navigant took some of these into account and reduced its assessment of value to between \$745 million to \$945 million for residual shareholder value on per share value of \$7.29 to \$9.24, using a discounted cash flow ("DCF") approach. Navigant tested the DCF approach against the EBITDA approach. It is interesting to note that on the EBITDA analysis approach Navigant only comes up to a conclusion that the equity is valued at \$8 million to \$83 million or \$0.09 to \$0.81 per share. If the Court were to accept that as an accurate valuation, or something at least of positive value even if not in that neighbourhood, then I would have to take into account existing shareholder interests in determining whether the Plan was fair, reasonable and equitable – and not only *vis-à-vis* the affected creditors but also *vis-à-vis* the interests of the existing shareholders given that at least some of their equity would be above water. I understand the pain and disappointment of the existing shareholders, particularly those who have worked hard and long with perhaps their life savings tied up in S shares, but regrettably for them I am not able to come to a conclusion that the existing equity has a true positive value.

[23] The fight in the Stelco CCAA proceedings has been long and hard. No holds have been barred as major affected creditors have scrapped to maximize their recovery. There were direct protracted negotiations between a number of major affected creditors and the new equity sponsors under the Plan, all of whom had access to the confidential information of Stelco pursuant to Non Disclosure Agreements. These negotiations established a value of \$5.50 per share for the new common shares of a restructured Stelco. That translates into an enterprise value (not an equity value since debt/liabilities must be taken into consideration) of \$816.6 million for Stelco, or a recovery of approximately 65% for affected creditors. The parties engaged in these negotiations are sophisticated experienced enterprises. There would be no particular reason to believe that in the competition involved here that realistic values were ignored. Further, the affected creditors generally were rather resoundingly of the view by their vote that an anticipated 65% recovery was as good as they could reasonably expect.

[24] The 45th Report of the Monitor had a chart of calculations to determine the level of recovery of affected creditors at various assumed enterprise values up to and including the top end of Navigant's range of enterprise value (as contrasted with residual equity value).

At the high end of Navigant's range of revised enterprise value, \$1.6 billion, the Monitor calculated that affected creditors would still not receive full recovery of their claims.

[25] The EH cited the sale of the EDS Canada claim to Tricap as being at a premium as evidence in support of Navigant's conclusion. However, the fact was that this claim was purchased not at a premium, but rather at a discount. That would be confirmation of the opposite of which the EH has been contending.

[26] Despite a very comprehensive capital raising and asset sale process, with the market alerted and well canvassed, and with the ability to conduct due diligence, no interested party came forward to conclude a deal. Even since the December 9, 2005 vote when the terms of the Plan were available, no interested party has come forward with any expression of interest which would attribute value to the existing shareholders.

[27] Stelco's experts, UBS and BMO Nesbit Burns, both have given opinions that there is no value to the existing equity. Their expert opinions were not challenged by cross-examination. Both these advisors are large sophisticated institutions; both have extensive experience in the steel industry.

[28] UBS calculated the enterprise value of Stelco as being in the range of \$550 million to \$750 million; BMO Nesbitt Burns at \$650 million to \$850 million. On that basis the unsecured creditors would receive less than full recovery of their claims, which would lead to the conclusion that there is no value for the existing shareholders. The Monitor commissioned an independent estimate of the enterprise value from its affiliate, Ernst & Young Orenda Corporate Finance Inc's Valuation Group. That opinion came in at \$635 million to \$785 million.

[29] I would note that Farley Cohen, the principal author of the Navigant report, does not have experience in dealing with integrated steel companies. I find it unusual that he would have customized his approach in calculating equity value by not deducting the Asset Based Lenders loan. Brad Fraser of BMO Nesbitt Burns stated that such customization was contrary to the practice at his firms both present and past and that the Navigant's approach was internally inconsistent with respect thereto as to 2005 to 2009 cash flows as contrasted with terminal value. The Navigant report appears to have forecasted a high selling price for steel combined with low costs for imports such as coal and scrap, which would be contrary to historical complementary movements between steel prices and these inputs.

[30] Navigant relies on an average price of \$525 US per ton as provided by MBR. This is a single source as to this forecast. While a single analyst may come up with a forecast which is shown by the passage of time to be dead on accurate, it would seem to me to be more realistic and prudent to rely on the consensus approach of considering the views of a greater number of "representative" analysts, especially when prices appear volatile for the foreseeable future. That consensus approach allows for consideration of the way that each analyst looks at the market and the factors and weights to be given. The UBS opinion reviewed the pricing forecast of eight analysts and BMO Nesbitt Burns' ten analysts.

Interestingly, MBR's choice of a price at the top of the band would seem at odds as the statements on the MBR website foreseeing downward pressure on steel prices in 2006 because of falling prices in China; although this inconsistency was pointed out, there was no response forthcoming.

[31] Navigant estimated Stelco's financial performance for the last quarter of 2005 and made a significant upward adjustment. However, the actual experience would appear to indicate that such an adjustment would overstate Stelco's results by \$124 million.

[32] Navigant's DCF approach involved a calculation of Stelco's enterprise value by adding the present value of a stream of cash flow from the present to 2009 and the present value of the terminal value determined as at 2009 so that the terminal value represents the majority (60% approximately) of enterprise value as calculated by Navigant. MBR chose a 53-year average steel price despite significant changes over that time in the industry. However, coal and scrap costs were determined as at 2009. This produced the anomalous result that steel prices are rising while costs are falling. This would imply great structural difficulties (economically and functionally) in the steel industry generally and a lack of competition. A terminal value EBITDA margin for Stelco would then be implied at approximately 26% or some 11% higher than the EBITDA margin actually achieved by Stelco in the first quarter of 2005, the most profitable quarter in the history of Stelco.

[33] Interestingly, since Navigant's approach in fact would decrease calculated value, UBS and BMO Nesbitt Burns used a weighted average cost of capital ("WACC") for Stelco in the range of 10% to 14%; Navigant used 24%. A higher WACC will result, all other things being equal, in a lower enterprise value. Navigant considered that there should be a 10% to 15% company-specific premium because of the risks associated with Stelco vis-à-vis the higher steel prices forecast by MBR. This would appear to imply that there was recognition that either MBR was aggressive in its forecasting or that price volatility would caution one to use consensus forecasting. Colin Osborne, a senior executive of Stelco, with considerable experience in the steel industry provided direct evidence on the substantial differences between each of Stelco, AK Steel, U.S. Steel and Algoma. Mr. Cohen acknowledged in cross-examination that these differences made Dofasco a more valuable company than Stelco. As set out at para. 74 of the Stelco Factum:

74. The specific difference identified by Mr. Osborne which made Dofasco unique include but are not limited to:
- (a) non-union, flexible work environment (vs. Stelco, Algoma, AK Steel and U.S. Steel);
 - (b) legacy costs which are very low due to non-conventional profit sharing, which limits liability (vs. Stelco, AK Steel, Algoma and U.S. Steel);
 - (c) high historical cap-ex spend per ton (vs. Stelco, Algoma and U.S. Steel);

- (d) a flexible steelmaking stream in terms of a hybrid EAF and blast furnace BOF stream in Hamilton and a mini-mill operation in the U.S. (vs. Stelco, Algoma, U.S. Steel and AK Steel which are all blast furnace based steel makers);
- (e) a value added product mix focused on coated products and tubing (vs. Stelco and Algoma which focus on hot roll); and
- (f) a strong raw material position with excess iron ore and self-sufficiency in coke (Algoma, Stelco and AK Steel all have dependence to various degrees on either iron ore or coke or both).

Dofasco and Stelco are not in my view fungible. There are incredible differences between these two enterprises, to the disadvantage of Stelco.

[34] The reply affidavit of Mr. Fraser of BMO Nesbitt Burns calculated the effect of all of the acknowledged corrections to the initial Navigant report and other adjustments. The result of this exercise was a conclusion by him that there was no value available for existing shareholders. This, along with all the other affidavits provided on the Stelco side, was not cross-examined on.

[35] While not referred to in the Factum of EH, there were a number of quite serious allegations raised in material filed by the EH against management of Stelco concerning bias and manipulation. Mr. Osborne responded to each of these allegations; he was not cross-examined. I find it unfortunate that such allegations appear to have been made on an unsubstantiated shotgun approach.

[36] The position of the EH is that certain of the features of the Plan should be assumed as transportable directly and without change into a scenario where some insolvency rescuer emerges on the scene as the equivalent of a White Knight, one it would seem which has been awakened from slumber. I am of the view that presumes too much. For example, I take it that the Province would not automatically accept this potential newcomer without question; nor would it likely relish the resumption of weeks of hard bargaining. I would think it unwise, impudent and high stakes poker (with other peoples' money) to speculate as did Taylor in para. 41 of his December 23, 2005 affidavit:

41. Were Stelco to emerge from CCAA protection and were the province to carry out its threat to revoke Stelco's entitlement to the benefit of section 5.1 the end result would likely be a liquidation of the company. The Province would be responsible for a substantial portion of Stelco's pension promise. It would clearly not be in the Province's self-interest to force Stelco into liquidation. It was, in other words, an obvious bluff. Yet the notion of calling this bluff does not appear to have crossed management's mind.

This should be contrasted with the views of the Monitor in its 44th Report at para. 61:

61. It should also be noted that the Pension Plan Funding Arrangements and the \$150 million New Province Note embodied in the Approved Plan were agreed to by the Province only in the context of the terms of the Approved Plan and, in particular, the capital structure, liquidity and other elements contemplated therein. The Province has advised that its proposed financing and the Pension Plan Funding Arrangements should not be assumed to be available if any of the elements of the Approved Plan are changed.

[37] The end result is that given the above analysis, I have no hesitation in concluding that it would be preferable to rely upon the analysis of UBS, BMO Nesbitt Burns and Ernst & Young Orenda, both as to their direct views as to the enterprise value of existing Stelco and as to their criticism of the Navigant and MBR reports concerning Stelco. Therefore, I conclude that the existing shareholders cannot lay claim to there being any existing equity value. Given that conclusion, it would be inappropriate to justify cutting in these existing shareholders for any piece of the emergent restructured Stelco. If that were to happen, especially given the relative values and the depth of submersion of existing equity, then it would be unfair, unreasonable and inequitable for the affected creditors.

[38] That then leaves the remaining question: Does it appear likely that the Plan will be implementable? I have been advised on Wednesday, January 18th that I would receive executed term sheets (which would address the issues raised by the Monitor discussed above) by 5 p.m., Friday, January 20th.

[39] The motion and adjournment request of the EH is dismissed.

[40] There was a request to extend the stay to March 31, 2006. I am of the view that it would be sufficient and desirable to extend the stay (subject, of course, to further extension) to March 3, 2006.

[41] I have received the term sheets together with the Monitor's 48th Report by the 5 p.m. January 20th deadline and find them satisfactory as demonstrating to my analysis and satisfaction that the Plan is implementable as discussed above, subject to a comeback provision if anyone wishes to dispute the implementability issue (the onus remaining on Stelco). My decision today re: implementability should in no way be taken as deciding any corporate reorganization issue or anything of that or related nature. I therefore sanction and approve the Plan.

J.M. Farley

DATE: January 20, 2006